Transforming capabilities in offshoring processes – Longitudinal development of organisational resources and routines in four Danish offshoring enterprises by Jørgensen, Claus et al.
 
1 
Transforming capabilities in offshoring processes 
– Longitudinal development of organisational resources and routines in four Danish 
offshoring enterprises 
 
Abstract 
Purpose - This paper’s focus is on how organisational capabilities, enhancing the dynamic 
capability perspective, evolve during a more than five-year offshoring process in four Danish 
SMEs.  The strategic decision to offshore some manufacturing activities meant that 
capabilities were ruptured and had to be rebuilt. 
Design/methodology/approach - The empirical investigation took the form of qualitative 
case studies with a longitudinal orientation focusing in on a few events in the four cases 
(strategic change in the sourcing configuration) as a process research design (Pettigrew, 1990; 
Van de Ven, 2007). Interviews were transcribed and coded in NVivo. 
Findings - The four cases followed distinct trajectories, but they all changed their routines 
regarding how to handle knowledge, including both technology and human resources. A need 
for specific human resources acting as boundary spanners arose, transforming both intra- and 
inter-organisational practices in all four cases. More complex activities were moved offshore 
to enhance the dynamic capabilities of the companies regarding both product development as 
well as specific processes, thereby transforming/reconfiguring the organisational capabilities 
of the companies.  However, in the two small-sized cases, more complex/less routinised 
activities were backsourced, demonstrating a significant problem over time with the 
development of sufficient organisational resources to maintain seizing and sensing 
capabilities within these companies in comparison with the two other medium-sized cases. 
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Research limitations – The fact that most of the data were generated from an inside-out 
perspective, taking the point of departure in the core firms, can be viewed as a limitation. Our 
data on the wider network are also limited. Finally, our interviews are conducted relatively 
infrequently when considering the length of the process. 
Practical implications - The four longitudinal cases show that the longer-term offshoring 
journey does not involve a single path or a single best practice. The cases show captive as 
well as outsourcing arrangements and even enterprise transformations. The cases demonstrate 
a common focus on finding and nurturing core suppliers and core business processes, which 
can be characterised as continual learning and development of organising capabilities. 
Originality/value – The study contributes to the growing body of research into dynamic 
(organisational) capabilities in an offshoring and SME context. 
Keywords – Offshoring, organizational capabilities, organisational practices, routines, SMEs 
Paper type – Empirical based research paper 
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Introduction 
This paper’s aim is to study how SMEs’ capabilities evolve during a long-term offshoring 
process. Thereby turning the focus from the “whether” and “what” questions which have also 
received the main attention in Business process outsourcing (BPO) (Lacity et al., 2011) 
toward the less researched “how” question (Mugurusi and de Boer, 2013) and treating the 
offshoring process as an organisational capability of consequence, similar to (for example) 
manufacturing capabilities (Pratap, 2014) or IT capabilities (Lacity et al. 2011). The “How” 
question turns its focus towards “how the offshoring firms actually proceed to integrate and 
connect the offshored activities at the new location with the original activities at home” 
(Mugurusi and de Boer, 2013: 215). The empirical material encompasses four Danish SMEs. 
The reconfiguration of resources and routines contribute to the changing capabilities in the 
SMEs during the offshoring process. This offshoring process is a natural change/path in 
(western) SMEs’ business models, where offshoring is often seen as a necessary change of 
their value creation in the value chain (Porter, 1980) to stay competitive. (Strategic) sourcing 
decisions might lead to greater emphasis on sourcing capabilities with a positive impact on 
performance (Su and Gargeya, 2012) where companies over time also tend to increase the 
amount of sourced processes (Lacity et al. 2011; Lacity and Willcocks, 2014). This 
development is also supported by Plugge and Janssen (2009) showing how the ability of 
service providers affect their sourcing capabilities, where the adaptability can be developed 
through the service providers’ organizational capabilities, more specifically by managing 
relationships and procedures to handle change.  
Dynamic capabilities (Teece et al., 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Teece 2007) are 
connected to the change of operational capabilities and thus the modification of organisational 
assets. These dynamics are of significant interest and the findings explain how to achieve 
competitive advantage, but at an abstract level, neglecting the detailed processes and activities 
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explicating the dynamic capabilities (Regner, 2008) which have been e.g. addressed in the 
identified practices that distinguish Best-in-class BPO performance (Lacity and Willcocks, 
2014).  
By tuning in on the organisational aspect of dynamic capabilities, we intend to make the 
understanding of the development of dynamic capabilities more explicit. As strategic 
challenges continue to be highly dynamic, SMEs are forced into recurrent changes. Unlike in 
classical co-located organisations, this leads to a stronger emphasis on relations between 
elements of the organisation. Cheung et al. (2010) indicate that the strategic nature of 
relationship learning is important in cross-border business-to-business relationships, where 
global, environmental and inter-organisational conditions influence the learning capabilities 
of the involved actors. Further, to succeed with a sourcing decision a supplier screening 
framework is suggested by Feeny et al. (2005) consisting of 12 supplier capabilities. The 
authors suggest in IT sourcing to focus upon leadership, and not the governance part, as well 
as the individual leading of supplier account teams indicating the importance of relational 
capabilities.   
Pagano’s review (2009) of relational capabilities, drawing on Heimeriks (2004) and 
Heimeriks and Duysters (2007), sets out to link internal organisational mechanisms with 
external relations. The aim is to disentangle specific components of relational capabilities at 
the micro level, moving beyond the setting up of organisational units (Pagano, 2009: 906). 
Pushing Pagano’s (2009) definition further, organisational capability can be defined as: the 
capability to develop and run routines and practices in a firm that can manage and develop 
its external performance. The point of departure for the paper is the understanding of the 
dynamic capabilities that lead to the organisational capability framework, which introduces 
the analytical elements of organisational functions, tools, management/leadership and 
boundary spanners. This is then in turn analysed through our four cases, where some of the 
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cases have moved back and forth in terms of the traditional quantitative definitions of SMEs 
(the EU: less than 250 employees/the US: less than 500 employees). However, the case 
companies exhibit some common characteristics according to Storey (2005): they are 
generally owned and managed by the same individual or group of individuals; they lack 
market power, having only a small share of markets or – more unusually – a bigger share of a 
tiny or localised market; they are legally independent in the sense of not being owned by a 
larger group of firms, which makes us choose to keep the four case companies underneath the 
umbrella of the SME categorisation throughout the study period and splitting them at the end 
into two subcategories of small-sized and medium-sized companies, respectively. 
 
Dynamic Capabilities 
In the resource-based view, firms are conceptualised as a bundle of resources heterogeneously 
distributed across firms, and the access and differences among resources have some kind of 
persistency over time (Wernerfelt, 1984). This view has been further extended by arguing that 
resources are combined and used differently and thereby termed dynamic capabilities (Teece 
et al., 1997), where sustainable competitive advantages are achievable if firms have valuable, 
rare, inimitable and non-substitutable resources and, by these, implement value-creating 
strategies (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). This means that the resources are seldom isolated 
and static; rather, they are dynamic. Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) argue that dynamic 
capabilities are seen as antecedent organisational and strategic routines by which managers 
alter, acquire, integrate and recombine their resource base to create the value-creating 
strategies. Teece (2007) introduces the three dynamic capabilities of sensing, seizing and 
reconfiguration to create new paths and asset bases to maintain/increase firm 
performance/competitive advantage. 
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Capabilities can be classified as operational or dynamic (Helfat, 2003). Operational 
capabilities are “high-level routines (or collection of routines) that, together with its 
implementing input flow, confers upon an organization’s management a set of decision 
options for producing significant outputs of a particular type” (Winter, 2000: 983), whereas 
dynamic capabilities build, integrate or reconfigure operational capabilities. Both terms 
include routines (Zollo and Winter, 2002). Routines refer to some kind of “repetitive pattern 
of activity”, where operational routines concern performing activities by using routines to 
coordinate and execute the variety of tasks required to perform, for instance, manufacturing. 
Dynamic capabilities contain two types of routines: routines necessary to perform a task and 
routines necessary to coordinate tasks (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003). Routines are the interplay 
between memory and action; patterns of behaviour become routinised, and memory reduces 
the need for a problem-solving search through the stored results of prior successful actions 
(Miller et al., 2012). 
Looking at routines, a central concept is the experience of actors (Becker, 2004; Feldman and 
Pentland, 2003). Here, we refer to Turner and Fern’s notion of performance experience of 
actors as “the frequency of their historical performance of the routine, reflecting actors’ 
familiarity with their tasks, their context, and other participants performing the routine” 
(2012:1410). Routines are almost never carried out by actors alone; they are entangled in 
sociomaterial ensembles of actants, including artefacts (Latour, 2005; Leonardi, 2011; 
Orlikowski, 2007). These artefacts include various tools, templates, IT technologies and 
procedures. Furthermore, “routines involve multiple actors and operate at collective levels 
(i.e., group, organization), performances of the routine are also shaped by factors at the level 
of the individual actors themselves” (Turner and Fern, 2012:1410); accordingly, 
understandings emerge within and among actors in a routine. These actors are often referred 
to as boundary spanners, and they often participate in activities across organizational 
 
7 
boundaries as well as interactions between sub-units (Tushman and Scanlan, 1981). Lensing 
in on offshore outsourcing, boundary spanning is crucial for moderating the relationship and 
building trust between client and service supplier (Abbott et al., 2013). 
Organisational capabilities in offshoring 
Resources, routines and capabilities will evolve and change over time (Pentland et al., 2012), 
and the analysis of the paper focuses on the transformation of organisational capabilities over 
time in the strategic sourcing process. As offshoring enterprises develop their organisations 
and their supplier base, their configuration becomes increasingly dispersed and delocalised 
(Hätönen and Eriksson, 2009).  
Hätönen and Eriksson (2009) have identified four phases in the offshoring process; transfer, 
resource-seeking, transformation and developmental. This is in keeping with life cycle 
thinking and indicates a known and predictable pattern of action to be taken. The first phase is 
transaction, which is characterised as a “big bang”, where the make-or-buy dilemma seriously 
tilts towards buy. Activities are turned over to outside vendors in the belief that market 
mechanisms of distant markets result in lower transactions costs. TCE is the main theory. The 
second phase is resource-seeking. Here, companies rely on external sources to provide 
production components and services, and the main theory is RBV. The third phase is 
transformational. The main theory is RBV in combination with organisation theory. In this 
phase, all parts of an organisation can, in principle, be turned over to outside vendors. And as 
offshoring and outsourcing become integrated, legitimate tools in the management repertoire, 
the timing of offshoring becomes the matter of concern. The fourth phase is development. 
Here, the organisation becomes increasingly boundless, and managing business development 
and continuous improvement of internal activities may even become part of 
offshoring/outsourcing arrangements. Management takes the form of portfolio management, 
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as many internal activities are project-oriented. However, longer-term perspectives of external 
sourcing are employed, even a ‘life cycle’ perspective. This implies that the main theory 
applicable is RBV, according to Hätönen and Eriksson (2009). 
Hätönen and Ericsson’s (2009) timescale, 1980-2007, broadly matches that of 
Hutzschenreuter et al. (2011), but while Hätönen and Ericsson (2009) understand the phases 
to be characterised by relations between the involved companies, Hutzschenreuter et al. 
(2011) view the changes as three waves of offshored functions: first, support functions within 
R&D, then technology-based support functions and, finally, interaction-based functions. 
Although the ‘life cycle’ perspective mainly focuses on outsourcing activities in the Hätönen 
and Ericsson model, we allow ourselves to use it more broadly in analysing our cases, which 
demonstrate a cacophony of outshore, inshore, backshore, nearshore, farshore, onshore and 
offshore as well as out-, in- or backsource choices during the period of study, making an RBV 
perspective very relevant. 
We choose to combine the identified phases by Hätonen and Ericsson with Pagano’s (2009) 
concepts due to their relational focus with organisational capabilities in offshoring. The 
introduction of Pagano’s (2009) relational capabilities helps in adding/identifying the shift of 
compositions of the organisational capabilities over time in and between the four phases. At a 
micro level, the organisational capabilities are seen as organisational functions, tools, 
management/leadership and boundary spanners. Please see figure 1 below regarding our 
analytical framework. 
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Figure 1: Analytical framework 
 
Organisational functions (extending on Pagano’s (2009) “function”) are functions both 
pooling necessary equipment and expertise and functions for external linking, such as an 
alliance department in charge of alliance-related tasks. Pagano (2009: 907) finds that the 
following extra-organisational functions might appear when offshoring: the Executive 
Steering Committee, international purchasing groups, global sourcing project teams, product 
teams for sourcing components and materials, lead buying systems and corporate contract 
coordinators. According to Feeny et al., 2005 the supplier especially needs to have highly 
developed project management and change management capabilities. McIvor et al. (2011) 
further highlight a need for strong governance to drive standardisation and performance 
improvement as well as a need for building relationships with both senior- and lower-level 
staff impacted by the structural changes. Furthermore, Feeny et al. (2005) highlight 
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governance in terms of a service review committee or board to evaluate performance over 
time. 
Tools involve human resource management and information systems to support knowledge 
management flows. First, Pagano (2009: 908) considers HR routines to be particularly 
important – for example recruiting, training and retention of purchasing personnel and 
engineers (Jensen, 2009; Lewin et al., 2009). Second, information and communication 
technologies, such as intranet solutions, are important. Hutzschenreuter et al. (2011: 256) find 
that “the required IT and communication support varies among different support functions. 
Before conducting any offshoring activity managers need to verify if the available 
technological support at the targeted offshore location is sufficient. In case of existing gaps 
managers either need to invest in infrastructure first or otherwise the targeted offshoring 
location is not suitable”. Srikanth and Puranam (2011) discuss different coordination 
mechanisms to mitigate the adverse performance consequences of interdependence between 
onsite and offshore locations, in which connection they distinguish between modularisation, 
ongoing communication and Tacit Coordination Mechanisms (TCM; shared work-related 
training and/or cultural sensitivity training, investment in technology tools, leverage of shared 
work experience, increased use of shared vocabulary). Their findings show a tendency for 
overinvestment in ongoing communication channels at the expense of TCMs. 
Management and leadership procedures (extending on Pagano’s (2009) “management and 
control procedures”) include coordination mechanisms between multinational corporations’ 
(MNCs) internal units, for example incentives to promote learning processes. Leadership is of 
particular importance as the organisational configuration is under continual development 
(Bryman, 1999). Pagano claims that the management and control procedures discussed in the 
literature lack knowledge management. Moreover, as the SMEs are under continuous pressure 
to change – among other things – their offshore constellation, leadership (for example in 
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terms of giving direction) is included as an important capability as well as routine in 
accordance with Lampel and Bhalla (2011: 357), who emphasise the need to “understand the 
routines attached to the individual and the coordinated web of activities through a connected 
set of processes”. This more direct leadership approach is elaborated by Feeny et al. (2005) 
highlighting the need to know how to identify, communicate and deliver the balance of 
activities required. 
Boundary spanners (extending on Pagano’s (2009) “external actors”): Involving external 
actors, such as consultants, provides knowledge resources related to the management of 
supplier partnerships. The literature on boundary spanners and boundary-spanning activities 
mainly focus on the individual level (Abbott et al., 2013). However, many other kinds of 
actors than consultants could link internal and external elements, thus crossing the core firm’s 
organisational boundaries. Crossing the core firm’s organisational boundaries can be 
addressed as transactive memory, which enhances the problem-solving efficiency (Miller et 
al., 2012). Such actors could include middlemen (Balkow, 2012), expats and other human 
intermediaries. More resources, as for example cross-cultural skills, moderating relationship 
and building trust (Abbott et al., 2013),  are critical for the effectiveness of boundary spanners 
in the boundary spanning activities. Pagano (2009: 909) finds very few studies on their role, 
but mentions intermediaries supporting the company in its supplier searches as well as 
insurance and customs management. Other types are trading companies, import promotion 
offices and external consultants.  
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Method 
The analysis is based on empirical material gathered over a period of five years between 2007 
and 2011. This paper’s analysis of dynamic capabilities in the strategic configurations of 
offshoring relies on the topical and theoretical similarity and openness of the empirical work, 
where organisational capabilities can be included as an overall theoretical term for discussing 
the more detailed findings of the study regarding knowledge integration and knowledge 
governance. The analytical design is a further iteration of the abductive approach of the 
original study, as this paper continues to use the systematic combining perspective (Dubois 
and Gadde, 2002). 
The interviews and the data gathering were influenced by a broad and open-minded 
understanding of strategic sourcing through offshoring. This material is used here to analyse 
organisational capabilities, and additional data collection was done to enable this; it, however, 
was only needed for a few missing subjects in the first material gathered. The empirical 
investigation took the form of qualitative case studies with a longitudinal orientation 
(Pettigrew, 1990). The choice of a longitudinal case study is suitable for gaining in-depth and 
contextual insights (Stake, 2005) like organizational capabilities, similar to existing empirical 
findings and theoretical contributions in the BPO/ITO literature (Su and Gargeua, 2012; 
Lacity and Willcocks, 2014; Lacity et al. 2010; Lacity et al. 2011). 
Four SMEs were selected on the basis – at the outset – of being globally operating SMEs in 
the textile and furniture industry with considerable experience in offshore sourcing. The field 
methods were onsite observations, semi-structured and unstructured interviews, and review of 
secondary materials. Respondents from each company were involved in commenting on case 
summaries, including revisions. Secondary materials used from the companies included 
annual reports, press releases, customer presentation material and stakeholder and media 
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material. Table 2 below depicts the number of interviews conducted in each company and the 
year in which they took place. 
 Case A  
(textile) 
Case B  
(textile) 
Case C  
(textile) 
Case D 
(furniture) 
2007/2008 1 1 1 1 
2008/2009 1 3 2 2 
2009/2010 2 2 1 2 
2010/2011 1 2 2 2 
Offshore 2011  5 (Ukraine) 3 (Vietnam)  
Total 6 13 9 7 
Table 2. Interviews conducted. 
The method was based on focusing in on a few events in the four cases (strategic change in 
the sourcing configuration) as a process research design (Pettigrew, 1990; Van de Ven, 2007). 
Interviews were transcribed and coded in NVivo (software from QSR International, 
Australia). The transcriptions, the codes from the transcripts, the revised summaries of the 
interviews and the secondary material were all used as the basis for the case descriptions 
presented here. Some details were changed due to anonymity concerns. The analytical 
strategy was based on Barley and Tolbert (1997). To identify and analyse possible scripts, 
four processes were adopted: (1) grouping the data by category or unit of observation, (2) 
identifying behavioural patterns (scripts) within categories, (3) identifying similarities across 
scripts and (4) comparing scripts over time. This study shows how factors and issues change 
over time by employing a real-time process approach based on narrative descriptions (Van de 
Ven, 2007). The cases are seen as single entities due to their small size, which implies that 
they have fairly simple organisational structures, indicating a single case category. As the 
process research design, we use a comparative method based on few cases and few events 
(strategic change), and we mainly use summary case studies as the typology of process 
research design (Van de Ven, 2007). Nvivo was used to build an axial tree-node structure 
based on both sequential and thematic codes. By building the coding structure in an ongoing 
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process, a number of focused codes, used to conduct the initial comparative study of the four 
case companies, became more directed, selective and conceptual (Charmaz 2006). We kept 
adding codes during the analysis of the four case companies until reaching a saturation stage. 
Then some of the thematic and sequential codes were combined and merged to rebuild the 
axial coding structure. The analytical work performed during the writing of the article can be 
characterised as less structured and more in accordance with Walsham’s (2006,) description 
of doing interpretive research and learning from the data itself in accordance with his belief 
that “the researcher’s best tool for analysis is his or her own mind, supplemented by the 
minds of others when work and ideas are exposed to them”.. Although each case represents 
important and potentially unique learning about strategic offshore sourcing (Stake, 2000), it is 
assumed that the variations between the cases studied will provide insights that will pave the 
way for examining the complexity of the strategic offshore sourcing process. We therefore 
allow ourselves to compare the cases. 
Company A 
The company, which outsourced its knitting activities to Eastern Europe, was one of the first 
knitting companies in the textile cluster in Central Jutland of Denmark to outsource its 
manufacturing activities. In 2008, the company had approximately ten employees in Denmark 
and between 50 and 100 employees in the Baltic countries. The company kept all but its 
manufacturing operations in Denmark and used its production managers as knowledge 
integrators for the offshored and recently outsourced production in the Baltic region. This is 
still the case, as the company believes that it has not transferred and translated adequate 
manufacturing knowledge from Denmark to the Baltics. Due to this failure, the company has 
back- and inshored its complex knitting production as well as part of the original production 
equipment that was moved to the Baltics during offshoring. The company, however, 
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continues the simpler offshored production of socks in another Baltic country and sources 
more simple knitting products from the outsourced Baltic supplier. 
Company B 
The company was one of the first in the Central Jutland textile cluster to offshore its sewing 
activities to Eastern Europe. After outsourcing to various Eastern European countries for 
some time, the company established its own production capabilities in Ukraine. In 2008, it 
had about 300 employees in Ukraine and 30 employees in Denmark. Initially, the company 
kept all other operations in Denmark and used its production managers as boundary spanners 
for the offshored production. The company established its own production activities in 
Ukraine because its former suppliers raised costs and because there was a lack of local 
Ukrainian suppliers with resource complementarities at the time the company decided to 
move its sewing activities. It tried to move one of its more complex activities, design, to the 
Ukranian site as well, but after a short period of time (less than two years), it chose to 
backshore the activity to its headquarters in Denmark. The main reason was a lack of 
understanding of the company’s BtB customers’ demands at the Ukrainian site, creating 
frustration among both the sales people at the headquarters as well as their BtB contacts. 
Company C 
The company outsourced its sewing activities in the late 1980s to Eastern Europe as an early 
mover in the Central Jutland textile cluster. It kept all other activities in Denmark and shifted 
the outsourcing activities among suppliers in Eastern Europe as well as India, China and 
Vietnam. Recently, Company C began to move its Eastern European activities to its own 
newly established production facilities in Vietnam, while retaining outsourced sewing 
activities in China, India and Vietnam. In mid-2009, it employed around 1,100 workers in 
Europe and Vietnam and had about 2,500 workers in the Far East engaged in outsourcing. 
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The establishment of production facilities in Vietnam reflected a wish to reduce costs as well 
as the time to market of the manufactured goods. For these reasons, the physical location of 
the raw material stock was moved from Denmark to Vietnam as well. In the captive 
arrangement in Vietnam, the more complex products are manufactured as well as new 
products to the market, whereas the standardised products are mainly outsourced to local 
manufacturers in Vietnam. 
Company D 
Company D has recently changed its strategy from furniture production to retailing. It has 
also reduced its ownership of the production units (offshore outsourcing). At the beginning of 
2009, the company had around 560 employees in Denmark and abroad. Furniture production 
involves two parts: upholstery and flat-pack furniture. A few years ago, the company decided 
to outsource the production of upholstery furniture because the skills required are less 
demanding and more labour-intensive compared to the flat-pack area. The flat-pack furniture 
department was not outsourced due to flexibility and quality demands in the production 
process, a lack of competent suppliers in Eastern Europe and Asia and the historical path 
within the company. However, it still maintains a very close relationship to its main supplier 
of upholstery products, as it is run by the former management team of the now offshore 
outsourced upholstery activities previously run in Denmark. 
 
Analysis   
As an opening remark, it can be concluded that, at the end of the study period, the case 
companies considered themselves to be successful. Although company performance and 
offshoring and/or organisational capabilities do not necessarily imply financial results of the 
core group, it can be noted that, during the study period, the four case companies, with their 
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changing configurations, have managed to navigate through the stormy waters of the financial 
crisis; indeed, at the end of the study period, Case C and D have again picked up speed with 
regard to growth in sales and financial results. In comparison, Case A and B have reached a 
milestone regarding their new downstream brands, passing the break-even point, whereas 
their captive upstream offshore activities are slightly decreasing in Case B and the former 
offshored complex activities have been backshored in a significantly reduced version in Case 
A. However, Case A and B both interpret this development as a successful one based on them 
similarly remarking that they are still here; many of their former Danish colleagues do not 
exist anymore. “We are still here. That is probably it” [success or not with sourcing abroad], 
Sourcing manager, Case A. “The choice to do something [offshore manufacturing] was based 
upon the fact that we were forced to do something. Either close shop and say, nice journey, or 
we would have to develop ourselves [the company]”, Key employee covering cross-functional 
and cross-national roles, Case B. The challenge of managing successful relational capabilities 
as an requirement to succeed is mentioned by the sourcing manager in Case D: “The best 
[configuration] out there [China] is in at least three cases, where we come in and can see that 
we can double his [the supplier’s] turnover within a year. In our setup this is the best 
[approach], we can then use the time to create a relation in the Chinese way with them. This is 
what has created our success.” The boundary spanners help create a successful dynamic 
capability due to the chosen sourcing configuration according to the CEO in Case C: “We are 
privileged as we produce [outsourced as well as captive] in a lot of different factories in 
several countries. If we get an idea in India about how things might be done more rationally, 
then we have som controllers [boundary spanners] who move around between the factories. 
When they visit the next factory in China they tell them, look you can do it like this or in this 
way which is quicker. In this way do we optimize the production of our factories [outsourced 
 
18 
as well as captive]… And [with this approach] do we optimize the factories compared to our 
competitors.”  
 Organisational routines and tools 
Organisational routines were part of the continuous work with handling knowledge between 
the entities in all four cases. The routines were in some of the cases made explicit through the 
use of both standardisation and IT tools, by which processes were teased out of the current 
domestic organisational configuration. This is most apparent in Case B, which continuously 
worked on creating its own domestic IT system.  
“These were the things we had to help them with – building some tools so they could control 
things and building some competences so they had someone who could control these things.” 
Key employee covering cross-functional and cross-national roles, Case B. 
“We have become better at holding shorter meetings and at efficiency in general. It is 
preferable for everyone that when we communicate, it is a precise form of communication...I 
still find myself thinking that we are a manufacturing company and that we produce. It is a 
communications company, and it is difficult culturally, as we have changed from being a 
producer to becoming a management and communications unit.” CEO, Case B. 
In Case C, the company used off-the-shelf IT products like ERP systems (SAP) adapted partly 
to the specifications of the company. But the company was still challenged regarding the 
integration of its organisational routines and communication: 
“We have some [Danish] logistics employees who are regularly over there for the same 
reason [communication challenges]. That is also why I continue to travel [to Vietnam]: to 
make sure that they understand [employees in Vietnam] what this is all about and our culture 
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– how to behave. If someone steals [they are fired]. All these things that seem basic 
management arguments at home, but might not be the case over there.” CEO, Case C. 
Case A never succeeded in integrating knowledge through standardisation and IT tools and 
chose to backsource its complex production activities after having moved its own production 
managers continuously back and forth between the domestic setting and the offshored 
production site. Case B chose to backsource its design activities due to significant 
coordination and translation challenges between its BtB customers, the company’s Danish 
sales team and designer positioned at the Ukrainian site. 
“We did let her try, but it [the designs] missed the mark completely, and it was really 
expensive to produce... In the end, it was decided to fire her, because she wanted the same pay 
level as Danish employees, and [she] wanted to work independently. This led to us hiring one 
more [designer], meaning that we have Maria, and the new [designer] is in the private label 
[department].” Key employee covering cross-functional and cross-national roles, Case B. 
Boundary spanners and Management/Leadership 
The management in all four cases were continuously involved in both the creation and 
implementation of new organisational routines as well as often in the direction of day-to-day 
operational matters, including the continuous work with building the content of the roles of 
the boundary spanners in the development of the organisational capabilities. 
Intermediaries of various kinds were used extensively in all four cases when the enterprises 
reached the transformation phase, but with significantly different outcomes. Case D used 
collaboration partners from Eastern Europe as flying controllers in Asia, while case A’s 
production managers flew back and forth to Eastern Europe. The company was challenged by 
its collaboration with an Indonesian-owned company with an Indian management team based 
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in Eastern Europe, which finally resulted in the decision to backsource the more complex 
manufacturing activities run by production managers previously acting as boundary spanners.  
“We are privileged because we produce at many different factories in many different 
countries. If one gets an idea in India about how things can be done more efficiently, we have 
some controllers that move around between the factories, and when they come to the next 
factory in China, they can say: have a look here, do it like this, and it will be done faster. In 
this way, we optimise the production of the factories. There is an efficiency gain, which we 
share. There is money in transferring knowledge that we might have picked up at another 
factory, and in this way, we manage knowledge.” CEO, Case C. 
“It is problematic [the cooperation with their partners]. It is perhaps the biggest problem – the 
cultural difference. A mix of Indians and Eastern Europeans, it is...It could hardly be worse.” 
CEO, Case A. 
Case B and Case C placed an external consultant at the offshore unit to develop knowledge 
and competences at the local offshored premises. The local general manager was a Dane in 
Case C, and the CEO in Case B had working experience from Scandinavia and the Baltics. 
“Right now we have a Danish director and a Hungarian production manager, and he has two 
assistant production managers, one of which is a Dane. She was the one who should have 
been production manager, but she did not think she could manage the job. [She has since left 
the factory and been replaced by another Dane, the Hungarian production manager is still 
employed]. We have a Korean employee who previously worked for one of our suppliers as a 
factory manager, and she is also assistant production manager. On the logistics side, we have 
a logistics manager from Yemen, who was trained in the west, but has lived in Vietnam since 
1984 and speaks Vietnamese.” CEO, Case C. 
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There seems to be a continuous need to have key employees, often expats, at close physical 
proximity, even though you do not have a captive production site as in Case D: 
“So I think that we, along the way, will get a foundation in China that makes us less 
dependent on constantly needing Danes posted. But it is still necessary for me. The Danes 
cannot succeed in China [by themselves]. The Danes are good at cutting down the price, the 
last bit. But our Chinese colleagues are good at relationships, at handling a crisis with a 
supplier, for instance; we cannot. Dealing with employees in China, we cannot do that either.” 
“…in China, we have our own people at the factories. Our office is approximately within a 
radius of 1.5 hours from the factories; we visit the factories every day and follow up on how 
things are going, talking about new products.” Sourcing Director, Case D. 
“It is not always that it is made 100% correct, but the dynamics are there, and you must 
ensure when it is created that they [stay this way]. We do that by having lots of QCs [quality 
controllers]. We have our own people who are moving around in our uniforms. They are there 
[at the supplier], they are paid by us, and they are there to ensure that everything we ship is 
ok.” CEO, Case D. 
The role of the expats is often, apart from managing day-to-day business activities, to 
translate the tacit knowledge about routines, organisational culture and values between the 
entities dispersed in time and space. They are regarded as being very valuable to the case 
companies, reflected in the fact that, although all case companies initially offshored their 
manufacturing activities to reduce costs, the SMEs accept that they receive significantly better 
salary packages compared to the local employees. Especially Case B is now trying to reduce 
the importance of expats as well as travel expenses by training local Ukrainians into 
becoming the new boundary spanners through the role of “merchandisers”, bridging the sales 
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activities in Denmark and the manufacturing activities in the Ukraine. This development 
gained speed after the failure of offshoring the design activities to the Ukraine. 
“Our travel budget, if you go back six years when it was our old manager who travelled four 
times a year, and only when he had to go abroad and give lectures [meaning hardly any travel 
budget at all]; [compared with] today, our travel budget is DKK one million.” CEO, Case B. 
“We have merchandisers who sit and communicate with purchasing, construction [and] 
production; the sales staff can talk with the constructors and vice versa, but it is always 
through one of these merchandisers... Sales can also speak with purchasing if they have 
developed new fabric types. However, it is constantly through the merchandisers. They are 
actually involved in everything. […] I would not say 50%, but 25% [local Ukrainian staffs’ 
reduced efficiency compared to their Danish counterparts]. But wages are 1/10 of Danish 
wages. A merchandiser down there is paid something similar to DKK 2,500 [per month].” 
Key employee covering cross-functional and cross-national roles, Case B. 
Reconfiguration and recombination of organisational capabilities 
In sum, the four cases show development of differentiated organising capabilities. Moreover, 
several of the SMEs possess relational sourcing competencies and transactional contract 
competencies as well as competencies in running a full-blown classical on-site manufacturing 
company with integrated supply and distribution. In this sense, the cases can be considered a 
progression of organising capabilities. However, it is more relevant to think of the organising 
capabilities as involving flexibility, adaptability and international/global outlook – the ability 
to establish and run profitable global organisational configurations in ever new forms and 
shapes. Now that product development and innovation activities have been mobilised across 
the present configurations, it is difficult to predict what the companies’ next move will be and 
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how their organising capabilities will match it. An overview of the different organisational 
capabilities of the four cases is shown in table 3 below. 
 
 
Case A Case B Case C Case D 
O
rg
an
is
at
io
n
al
 f
u
n
ct
io
n
s Divesting production in 
Denmark. 
Moving production to 
the Baltics, first captive 
then outsourced and, 
finally, partly 
backshored. 
Establishing own brand 
and downstream focus. 
Simple and small 
organisation. 
Divesting production in 
Denmark. 
Establishing captive 
sewing activities in the 
Ukraine after 
outsourcing. 
Moving more functions 
over time to the 
Ukraine, most recent 
procurement. 
Own children’s brand. 
Divisionalised structure. 
 
Establishing own 
offshore captive sewing 
production and 
warehousing in 
Vietnam. 
Increasing activities in 
Vietnam, from simple to 
complex manufacturing. 
Distribution focus 
through shop-in-shop 
concepts. 
Functionalised 
organisation.  
Divesting production in 
Denmark. 
Offshoring followed by 
outsourcing of the less 
complex upholstery 
production to first the 
Baltics, then China. 
Establishment of control 
centres in China.  
Distribution focus 
emerging; more and 
more retail outlets. 
Matrix organisation and 
projects. 
T
o
o
ls
 Reduced use of 
advanced IT tools. 
Decreasing physical 
movement of 
management back and 
forth between Denmark 
and the Baltics. 
ERP and Skype, email 
and video conferencing. 
Increasing physical 
movement of personnel 
back and forth between 
Denmark and the 
Ukraine. 
Development of own IT 
tool. 
Increasing physical 
movement of personnel 
back and forth between 
Denmark and Vietnam. 
ERP and Skype, email 
and video conferencing. 
Increasing physical 
movement of personnel 
back and forth between 
Denmark, the Baltics 
and China. 
M
an
ag
em
en
t/
le
ad
er
sh
ip
 Family-controlled and  
-led organisation. 
Family members are 
division managers.  
Production managers 
play a key role. 
 
Management-owned 
company (nine 
founders). 
Founders are partly 
division managers. 
Standardisation of 
processes.  
 
 
Family-controlled and  
-led organisation. 
Top-down management. 
Standardisation of 
processes. 
 
Family-ownership and 
top-management of core 
enterprise.  
Function managers are 
also project leaders.  
Standardisation of 
processes. 
Control centres, link 
between headquarters 
and key suppliers. 
B
o
u
n
d
ar
y
 s
p
an
n
er
s Alternating movement 
of production managers 
between Denmark and 
the Baltics until 
backsourcing of the 
complex knitting 
activities. 
Positioning of expats in 
captive entity in Ukraine 
to act as knowledge 
translators. 
Increasing competences 
among local Ukrainian 
employees being trained 
to perform as 
“merchandisers”. 
Use of “flying quality 
controllers”, first in 
Europe, then in the Far 
East. 
Positioning of expats in 
captive entity in 
Vietnam to act as 
knowledge translators. 
Strategic positioning of 
expats in control centres 
to act as knowledge 
translators and 
continuously help the 
local suppliers build 
their manufacturing 
capabilities and quality 
understanding. 
Table 3: Organising capabilities in the four cases 
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Discussion  
The four cases demonstrate the importance of organisational capabilities (Heimerik’s four 
dimensions (2004)) in combination with knowledge-handling practices. So, in this sense, the 
framework has proven useful. However, a tendency exists for the four-dimensional 
framework of capabilities to take over in an overly factor-oriented manner, implying a risk of 
losing the relations in between, because they are in danger of drowning in the 
instrumentalisation. This is reflected in the way that, for instance, standardisation through ISO 
certifications, placed into the management/leadership category by Pagano (2009), in the cases 
cross into the suggested tools category, functioning partly as an evaluation tool regarding the 
offshored activities as well as a formalisation tool of organisational routines. Moreover, it is 
evident in the case companies’ various ways of using expats, combining the elements of 
boundary spanners, management/leadership and organisational functions to mainly bridge the 
domestic and offshore activities. A final example can be found in the way Case D uses its 
established control centre as a key organisational capability to comprise all four identified 
elements by being initially an organisational function as well as a managerial/leadership 
element through the use of expats in leading positions in the control centre; expats who also 
function as boundary spanners between the Danish core enterprise and the Chinese suppliers 
to include the organisational tools element by the use of quality manuals to control the output 
at the supplier sites through its QC (quality control) personnel. 
Longitudinal developments 
The longitudinal change over time in the routines and practices can be difficult to capture, and 
the change within the episodes is not happening from day to day. For example, the production 
is not offshored from one day to the next. This is done over time with small changes and 
adjustments to the tools in use, to the individual and collective templates, IT technologies, 
 
25 
procedures etc. in a socio-material ensemble of actants all entangled in the daily activities. 
The start and the end of an episode are difficult to identify and make no sense, but it is 
possible to separate the routines related to the four phases identified by Hätönen and Eriksson 
(2009).   
In the table below, the longitudinal developments of the different SMEs are shown in 
connection with the four episodes. 
 
Transfer Resource-seeking Transformation (Developmental) 
C
as
e 
A
 Offshoring production. 
Production managers as 
boundary spanners. 
Outsourcing 
production.  
Continuous one-way 
movement of 
production managers. 
Backshoring complex 
knitting activities. 
Establishing own 
product segment brand 
C
as
e 
B
 Offshore outsourced 
production. 
Captive offshore 
production. 
Manager with mixed 
background. 
Own IT system. 
Offshore captive part of 
design. 
Offshoring 
procurement. 
Failure in Egypt. 
Backshoring design. 
Establishing own 
product segment brand. 
Division strategy. 
Long-term placement of 
consultant. 
C
as
e 
C
 Offshore network (from 
domestic to European), 
no production unit. 
Supply from a range of 
changing offshore 
production units (from 
Eastern Europe to 
mainly India and 
China). 
Quality and flexibility 
issues. 
Offshore captive and 
network production. 
CSR at captive 
production unit. 
Increasing movement 
back and forth of 
employees between 
Denmark and the 
Vietnamese captive 
unit. 
More complex 
production integrated in 
the captive 
organisation. 
From 70/30 to 30/70 
split between 
outsourced and captive 
activities. 
Long-term placement of 
consultant. 
C
as
e 
D
 Domestic and offshore 
production. 
Partly outsourced 
production and 
innovation. 
From production to 
distribution. 
Moving people back 
and forth. 
Expats. 
Control centre. 
Distribution and 
integrated supply chain. 
Moving people back 
and forth. 
Expats. 
Second control centre, 
outsourcing of logistics 
centre. 
Table 4: Four cases – phase developments 
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The cases commenced their offshoring development with a focus on reducing manufacturing 
costs, with  organisations that were relatively divided, yet vertically integrated; Case A, C and 
D being partly upstream vertically integrated and Case B having no vertical upstream 
integration. Moreover, the structural organisational capabilities varied between the cases in 
terms of production, product development, sales, management and administration. Some of 
the SMEs (Case C and D) employed advanced standard tools such as Enterprise Resource 
Planning (ERP), which provided the companies with a host of administrative IT support tools; 
Case A did not really employ an advanced ERP system, whereas Case B decided to develop 
its own ERP system, Case C bought a standard ERP system that was partly modified to the 
companies’ wishes, whereas Case D continually included further mainly standard packages to 
its ERP system. The ERP systems were partly able to handle multi-location accounting, 
purchasing, production control and administration, although depending on the various 
capabilities and resources available at the supplier side as well and the companies’ internal 
resource allocation for maintenance and continual development/appropriation of the system. 
Management consisted of different profiles as for the capability of handling distribution, 
sourcing and production, and they developed in various ways and in importance in the 
different cases during the period of study.  
In the resource-seeking phase, the cases’ organising capabilities began to develop in different 
directions; for instance, in Case D from relying on internal production units and capabilities to 
relying on external offshored units of production dependent on relational/contractual 
relations, and in Case B and C, moving in the opposite direction, from relying on external 
offshored units of production to relying on offshored internal production units. Offshoring 
production created quality challenges in all cases, and the SMEs were forced to start 
developing alternative quality configurations like Case D’s organisational control functions in 
China and Case B’s continuous development of an IT system combined with a heavy use of 
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boundary spanners and standardised industrial certifications. Communication technologies, 
such as Skype, email and videoconferencing, became increasingly important in all cases, 
although especially Case B experienced problems due to broadband complications in Ukraine, 
which forced the company to use mainly emails as a basic communication technology.  
In the transformation/developmental phases, the cases transformed themselves into various 
constellations; Case A, B and D transformed from a production-based capability into 
including a distribution-based organising capability, whereas Case C added a production-
based organising capability to its already existing distribution and design capability. On the 
sourcing side, the levels of staff interaction continued in some cases, and in others, like Case 
B and D, staff increasingly moved back and forth between Denmark and the offshored 
activities, as the interaction became increasingly complex and began involving other activities 
than production activities, such as logistics, innovation and procurement. Case A made the 
opposite move and reduced the interaction of staff through the backshoring of the complex 
knitting activities, which also partly happened in Case B with the backshoring of the design 
activities. Expats were in all cases used to act as knowledge translators and continuously help 
local captive units or local suppliers build their manufacturing capabilities and quality 
understanding. Case B and C even placed Danish consultants at their captive offshore units to 
increase the knowledge-handling capability. 
None of the cases show signs of further dissolution of the organisational structure, as foreseen 
by Hätönen and Eriksson in their identified development phase. The technology tools prevail; 
the family ownership and/or management ownership of the core enterprise prevails (a 
generational handover is under preparation in Case A and D and has taken place in Case C 
and partly in Case B) and there are no signs yet of dissolution in the development phase in the 
cases, although in Case B, the firing of one of the nine owners could be perceived as a slight 
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dissolution. However, the dismissal was mainly due to the offshoring of the procurement 
activities in which the owner was engaged, which does not really indicate any dissolution. 
In sum, we have compared the companies by their available organisational resources 
(including size) to traject between the suggested four phases by Hätonen and Ericsson. Over 
time, the two medium-sized cases succeeded in moving into a real transformation phase by 
keeping their activities offshored and using boundary spanners more permanently, 
exemplified by the long-term placement of consultants, moving people back and forth and 
recruiting additional expats. The two small-sized cases, however, have struggled to stay 
within the transformation phase due to a lack of sufficient available organisational resources 
to match the various initiated projects by the two companies during the study period. In 
comparison with the two medium-sized companies, they have especially been challenged in 
their wishes to allocate further resources to the continuous building of downstream initiatives. 
As there are no indications of a developmental transition taking place in any of the 
companies, we do not see this phase as an active phase; however, it might evolve into a 
possible future trajectory in SMEs as well. 
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Implications 
The four cases have demonstrated the importance of organisational capabilities in 
combination with knowledge handling. However, a tendency was found for the four-
dimensional framework of capabilities to take over in an overly factor-oriented manner, even 
a risk of losing the relations in between them over time, as they may drown in the 
instrumentalisation. In the cases studied, the four elements are interlinked over time as well; 
for instance, during the study period, the IT tool influenced and was influenced by the 
distribution of organisational functions between the domestic and offshore captive entity as 
well as needed the interference of boundary spanners in its continuous implementation of 
various modules. This development is shown in figure 1 through the changing compositions 
of the four capabilities in the offshoring phases, where especially the importance of Boundary 
spanners. Management/Leadership and Tools become significant to maintain the sensing and 
seizing capabilities challenged by the reconfiguration of the organisational functions, which 
again were driven by the strategic sourcing decisions made in the case companies. 
The cases followed mainly show the offshoring of manufacturing activities and, in individual 
cases, also procurement and logistics, but none of the cases really apply a project 
organisation. They prefer more classic ways of organising, although one of the cases tends 
towards a matrix organisation. Empirically, the four longitudinal cases show that the longer-
term offshoring journey does not involve a single path or a single best practice, expanding and 
exemplifying Lacity and Willcocks (2014) warning that following best practice is not a 
guarantee for good performance. The cases show captive as well as outsourcing arrangements 
and even enterprise transformations. The cases demonstrate a common focus on finding and 
nurturing core suppliers and core business processes, which can be characterised as continual 
learning and development of organising capabilities. Furthermore, the knowledge handling 
varies between the cases over time, where the four elements of organising capability are 
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combined in various ways during the three identified longitudinal phases. What is interesting 
as well is the backsourcing decisions made in two of the cases to re-establish the seizing and 
sensing capabilities ruptured by the reconfiguration of the organisational functions. This 
indicates that the two smallest companies where not able to develop/maintain these 
capabilities in the new configurations even though both cases had part/full captive governance 
configurations. This development emphasizes the need in SMEs to consider strategically 
which processes and activities can and should be offshored and thereby the need to question 
the present sourcing path trajectory. This consideration is also addressed by Su and Gargeya 
(2012) who found that strategic oriented sourcing plays a vital role, putting more emphasis on 
developing sourcing capabilities. 
As an outcome of the analysis we propose that when moving from the transfer phase towards 
the following three phases of resource-seeking; transformation and possibly developmental 
there seems to be a growing demand towards the three organisational functions Boundary 
Spanners, IT Tools and Management/Leadership caused by the rupture of the Organisational 
functions. This demand increases from phase to phase due to an increasing complexity in the 
sourcing configuration putting pressure on the three organisational capabilities, where an 
alternative to developing these capabilities might be a reduction in complexity through the 
backsourcing of previous offshored activities. This development was also suggested by 
Lacity, Willcocks and Rottman (2008) as a trend of outsourcing experience helping 
companies becoming smarter at insourcing. The increasing complexity in the sourcing 
configuration also indicates that the classic argument that the advances in ICT technology 
only to a certain level is able to accommodate the challenges of ever more complex sourcing 
arrangements, also addressed by Lacity and Wilcocks (2014). We suggest that these 
propositions should be investigated in more detail regarding both industries and size of 
companies in future studies.  
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Conclusion  
This aim of this paper was to study how the long-term evolvement of organisational 
capabilities proceeds in a long-term offshoring process in four Danish SMEs. The strategic 
decision to offshore disrupted capabilities, which initially concerned manufacturing 
capabilities, forced the SMEs to both rebuild and establish new organisational capabilities 
during the study period. These organisational capabilities are conceptualised as routines 
surrounding organisational functions, tools, management/leadership and boundary spanners. 
The four cases followed distinctive trajectories changing their routines/practices for handling 
knowledge, including both technology and human resources. Specifically the use of key 
boundary spanners in both intra- and inter-organisational practices emerges as a key 
capability in all four cases.  The two medium-sized companies developed beyond 
manufacturing and offshored product development, thereby creating a growing need for new 
as well as transformed routines regarding knowledge-handling practices, whereas the two 
small-sized companies experienced a need to backsource their more complex activities 
(manufacturing in case A and design in case B), demonstrating a lack of sufficient resources, 
due to their size, to succeed in a real move into a transformation phase. 
The question of whether or not a critical size exists in terms of being engaged as a company in 
international upstream manufacturing activities remains open, especially when taking the 
distribution and availability of resources/capabilities as well as the negotiating power into 
consideration, as these factors are often mentioned as distinguishing differences between 
SMEs and MNEs. The differences in the case companies further underline the challenge of 
creating standard models of longitudinal developments of offshore sourcing; maybe even 
more so when focusing on SMEs. The ownership structure and leadership of SMEs often 
create more freedom to select diverging offshore motives over time and thereby establish the 
foundation for more varied and evolving longitudinal offshore journeys. As the CEO of Case 
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D stated: “As long as our headquarters are positioned here [in Denmark], the core competence 
will stay here. Not from a cost perspective, but from a strategic perspective, it [core 
competences] has to be where the heart [of the company] is beating”. 
 
Limitations and future research 
The fact that most of the data were generated from an inside-out perspective, taking the point 
of departure in the core firms, can be viewed as a limitation. Our data on the wider network 
are also limited. Finally, our interviews are conducted relatively infrequently when 
considering the length of the process, and experiences might get ex post rationalised, 
implying that we recognise that an ethnographic approach would have provided richer data on 
dynamic capabilities and strategising. Finally, we have chosen to focus the paper on the 
upstream activities of the case companies; a downstream focus would have shown another set 
of dynamic capabilities and strategising evolving over time.  
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